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The literature on the relationship between civil society and international institutions is 
rich and fast-growing. It has explored patterns of conflict and cooperation between civil 
society and international organizations (Steffek, 2013), civil society's access to international 
institutions (Charnovitz, 2000; Tallberg et al., 2013), and politicization and contestation of 
international organizations' activities (Binder, 2008; Zürn, Binder and Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2012; 
Rixen and Zangl, 2013). Civil society actors play diverse roles vis-à-vis international 
institutions by being sources of advocacy and pressure, partners in service delivery, liaisons 
with local organizations, and monitors of international institutions' performance. This chapter 
focuses on civil society advocacy and analyzes how NGOs campaigned for a stronger UN 
response to the 1994 Rwandan genocide. It first provides an overview of the history and the 
current state of the relationship between civil society and the UN Security Council and then 
investigates how NGOs have influenced the Security Council's response to the genocide in 
Rwanda. It concludes by assessing the role that civil society played during the events and 
outlines directions for further research. 
 
Civil Society and the UN Security Council 
This chapter begins by examining the relationship between civil society actors and the 
UN Security Council (UNSC, sometimes also referred to as SC) in terms of their access to 
Security Council diplomats, strategies with which they target the Council, and influence they 
 
1 The final version of this chapter was published in Partnerships in International Policy-Making: Civil Society 
and Public Institutions in European and Global Affairs, edited by Raffaele Marchetti (Palgave Macmillan, 
2017). 
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have on Council decision-making. The Council has five permanent members, who are 
referred to as the P-5, and ten elected members serving two-year terms. Historically, many 
members, including the permanent ones, have been wary about engaging with non-state 
actors like NGOs. Recently, however, there has been a ‘substantial incorporation of 
prominent humanitarian, human rights, and development NGOs into Council activities’ 
(Graubart, 2008, p. 159). As the Council began addressing not only interstate but also internal 
conflicts in the early 1990s, it ‘entered an arena where the expertise and action of NGOs was 
especially critical’ (Paul, 2004b, p. 375). Therefore, during the 1990s, ‘Council members 
increasingly met with NGOs on their own and in groups, not only to brief them on recent 
developments...but also to seek their input’ (Malone, 2000, p. 33). The trend continued in the 
early 2000s, when the Council started considering a host of ‘soft security’ issues, such as 
children in armed conflict, HIV/AIDS, and even climate change. Today civil society actors 
actively ‘seek to gain some leverage against SC policy’ because they ‘have become aware of 
the increased role of SC and its expansion into the area of “human security” issues’ (Binder, 
2008, p. 7). Have they been successful in gaining access to the Security Council and 
influencing its deliberations, and through what strategies?   
 
Access 
In 1995, the NGO Working Group on the Security Council was created, initially to 
campaign for UN reform. In 1997, it changed focus to the facilitation of civil society dialogue 
with the Council. Members of the Working Group recognize that they have a large stake in 
the work of the Council given that the latter's decisions now ‘directly affect the core 
programs of many NGOs’ (NGO Working Group on the Security Council, 2010). 
Furthermore, the members realize that they possess ‘important information, expertise and 
experience that they want to offer the Council, to influence its thinking on policy matters’ 
(NGO Working Group on the Security Council, 2010). It is especially true of human rights 
and humanitarian NGOs that are in the field during conflicts and emergencies: in such 
situations, ‘international humanitarian NGOs are important information sources, and in some 
mass atrocity cases where other key information actors are absent, they may exclusively hold 
information that makes them especially influential with policy makers in advocating policy 
preferences’ (Labonte, 2013, p. 8). Some observers ague that the Working Group ‘has 
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become an influential forum at the UN level and it has astonishingly close access to high-
ranking UN officials and government delegates’ (Martens, 2004, p. 1066). They believe that 
it wields ‘considerable influence over Security Council deliberations, particularly on human 
rights and humanitarian matters’ (Mertus, 2005, p. 136). On the other hand, others offer a 
more modest assessment by noting that the Group at the very least ‘facilitates a flow of 
information’ between the Security Council and NGOs (True-Frost, 2007, p. 136). 
Another mechanism for engaging with the Council is the so-called Arria formula 
format. It is an informal briefing by an expert held outside the Council chambers. The 
formula was invented in 1992 when Venezuelan ambassador Diego Arria invited Council 
members to gather over coffee in the Delegates Lounge to hear the story of a Bosnian Croat 
priest who came to New York in the hope of meeting with individual ambassadors to discuss 
the Yugoslav crisis. In the mid-1990s, the format was predominantly used to organize 
briefings by officials from member states and intergovernmental organizations. In 1996 some 
elected members tried to broaden the use of the Arria formula to invite civil society actors, 
but met with resistance from the permanent members, notably the UK and Russia. For 
example, the September 1997 briefing by the Secretary-General of Amnesty International 
was upon the insistence of the P-5 not called an Arria formula meeting but an ‘ad hoc’ event 
(Paul, 2003). In the autumn of 1999, the sentiment shifted among some of the P-5: in the UK 
a new ambassador and new government were more open to consultations with NGOs. In 
April 2000, the Canadian and Dutch ambassadors organized an Arria formula meeting with 
CARE, Oxfam and Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) on the issue of the protection of civilians 
in armed conflict. Two more Arria formula briefings by NGOs followed that year, which 
‘indicated that the procedure had finally gained a firm foothold in the Council's repertoire’ 
(Von Riekhoff, 2002, p. 82).  
Today the situation is quite different from the mid-1990s: NGO participation in Arria 
formula meetings is quite common, while it is rarely used to invite the type of officials who 
gave briefings in this format two decades ago (Sievers and Daws, 2014, p. 92). For example, 
from January till November 2015, sixteen Arria formula meetings were held and eight of 
them included representatives of civil society, defined broadly as NGOs, policy research 
institutes, and individual activists but excluding political actors (Security Council Report, 
2015). Most member states are positive about the Arria formula. During the November 2011 
debate on the Council working methods, European countries, Australia and Egypt speaking 
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on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement commended the Arria formula as useful outreach 
tool. A representative of Luxembourg called upon the Council to ‘make more regular use of 
“Arria-formula” meetings in order to strengthen interaction between the Council and civil 
society and non-governmental organizations, whose analyses and experience on the ground 
may have particular relevance for the Council's deliberations’ (as cited in Sievers and Daws, 
2014, p. 77). At the same time, criticism of the Arria formula is ‘increasingly common’ 
because the meetings are seen as being ‘not nearly as effective as they used to be’: they are 
often attended only by junior diplomats and the discussion are ‘very limited’ (Security 
Council Report, 2007). This is echoed by some NGO representatives: according to Paul 
Mikov of World Vision, ‘the Arria-Formula meetings have become completely useless and 
inconsequential and have become a tool for them to say they have taken care of the NGOs’ 
(as cited in Niemetz, 2015, p. 149). Since the meetings are confidential, it is difficult to assess 
the depth and usefulness of the discussions taking place during such briefings. 
Overall, nowadays ‘the relative ease of access NGOs have to the Secretariat and 
diplomats (of some countries) stationed at UN headquarters means that the more active and 
credible NGOs have little trouble making their voices heard’ (Johnstone, 2003, p. 462). 
Indeed, several organizations, such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Oxfam, 
Save the Children, World Vision, CARE and the MSF ‘actively lobby the Council and meet 
with individual missions on a continuous basis’ (Global Policy Forum, 2013). 
 
Strategies 
Civil society actors, unlike states or even IOs, ‘have only discursive resources: 
expertise, arguments, and publicity’ (Deitelhoff, 2009, p. 44; see also Keck and Sikkink, 
1998, p. 16; Labonte, 2013, p. 54). Civil society actors ‘rely foremost upon their reputation as 
committed upholders of principled norms’ and ‘their expertise, their connections to a network 
of actors, including local activists and influential policy-makers, and their public support’ 
(Graubart, 2008, p. 160). Civil society actors targeting the Council usually employ several 
tactics at once: ‘[a]s NGOs gained experience in Council advocacy, many concluded that the 
most effective strategy combined diplomacy in New York with world-wide public advocacy 
campaigns’ (Paul, 2004a).  
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New York advocacy focuses on establishing links with UN Secretariat officials and 
member state diplomats. The ten elected Council members are assumed to be NGOs' ‘more 
natural partners’ (Paul, 2004b, 379). As these members struggled to cope with the growing 
decision-making burden associated with the expansion of the Council's responsibilities in the 
1990s and 2000s, they discovered that ‘NGOs can provide exceedingly valuable field 
information from their contacts in crisis areas, helping to improve their delegations' 
awareness of the issues’ (NGO Working Group on the Security Council, 2010). They 
welcomed ‘information, expertise and policy ideas from NGOs that could help them fulfill 
their responsibilities in the Council and act as a counter-weight to the large mission staffs and 
vast intelligence capabilities of the Council's P-5’ (Paul, 2004a). However, as the discussion 
in this chapter will demonstrate, civil society actors work with both elected and permanent 
Security Council members. 
 
Influence 
Determining the degree of influence that civil society has on Security Council 
deliberations is a notoriously difficult undertaking. While Binder (2008, p. 16) argues that 
‘the impact of SC-NGO interaction on a number of issues is fairly apparent’, he also 
acknowledges that ‘more detailed case studies will be required in order to trace the influence 
of NGOs in the Security Council decision-making process’. Overall, the NGO community 
has ‘successfully established regular consultations with the members of the SC and in some 
cases it has even authored Council resolutions’ (Niemetz 2015, p. 147). An example that is 
often cited in the literature is the role of NGOs in the promotion of the agenda on women, 
peace and security, which culminated in the adoption of Resolution 1325 in 2000 (Carey, 
2001; Hill et al., 2003; Ancil et al., 2004; True-Frost, 2007; Shepherd, 2008; Tryggestad, 
2009; Otto, 2010). For observers it was clear that Resolution 1325 ‘had come from the NGO 
side’ (Paul, 2010). In comparison to the issue of women, peace and security, the influence of 
civil society in other cases seems to be less apparent. This chapter aims to address this gap by 




Civil Society Advocacy during the Rwandan Genocide 
NGOs have played a significant role in shaping the Council's response to the 
Rwandan genocide by approaching permanent and non-permanent members of the Council 
and running a mass publicity campaign. Although the response was too little and too late, 
without NGO advocacy it might have been absent altogether. The failure of the UN to take a 
timely and decisive action in Rwanda has prompted a series of important reforms, such as the 
strengthening of the organization's early warning capacities, the creation of the Office of the 
Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, and the placing of the issue of the protection 
of civilians in armed conflict on the Council's agenda.  
 
The Context 
In October 1993, the UN deployed a mission to Rwanda, UNAMIR, to oversee a 
power-sharing agreement between the Hutu government and Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front, 
which was supposed to end the Rwandan Civil War. When Hutu extremists began a killing 
campaign against Tutsis in early April 1994, UNAMIR, despite its limited mandate and 
resources, managed ‘to protect tens of thousands of foreign and Rwandan civilians who 
sought protection in hotels, hospitals and the Amahoro stadium’ (Findlay, 2002, p. 278). 
After ten Belgian peacekeepers were brutally murdered, Belgium, the largest troop 
contributor to UNAMIR, recalled its contingent and began advocating a complete withdrawal 
of the mission. A perception developed that UNAMIR would not be able to protect civilians, 
although it ‘was actively engaged in such protection exercises, sometimes with as few as a 
handful of soldiers guarding thousands of individuals’ (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004, p. 152).  
Many powerful Security Council members, including the US, initially supported the 
idea of a withdrawal. New Zealand, which held the rotating Council presidency in April 
1994, opposed it, together with other small and middle powers on the Council, such as 
Argentina, Czech Republic and Spain (Kovanda, 2010, p. 200). On 21 April, the Council 
voted to reduce UNAMIR's strength from 2,548 to 270 troops. Short of a complete pullout, it 
made it impossible for UNAMIR to continue its protection activities. The coalition of small 
and middle powers began a campaign for the mission's reinforcement (Des Forges, 1999, p. 
968). On 17 May, the Council authorized a reinforced UNAMIR with a strength of 5,500 
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troops and mandate to contribute ‘to the security and protection of displaced persons, 
refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda’ and ‘take action in self-defence against persons or 
groups who threaten protected sites and populations’ (UNSC, 1994, p. 3). The reinforcements 
took months to arrive. The genocide ended in mid-July with a military victory of the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front. 
 
NGOs and Small and Middle Powers 
In the first weeks of the genocide, there was a severe dearth of information about what 
was going on in Rwanda. Small and middle powers, who did not have an extensive network 
of diplomatic missions in Africa, found it especially difficult to develop a correct appraisal of 
the situation. They therefore relied on the information supplied by NGOs: New Zealand and 
its allies were ‘deeply affected by independent information from non-governmental 
organizations about the ethnic character of the killings’ (Walling, 2013, p. 132). Czech 
ambassador Karel Kovanda recalls how ‘he had learned more about what was really 
happening in Rwanda from human rights groups in New York than from sitting in the secret 
Security Council meetings’ (Melvern, 2002). Kovanda started to develop an understanding of 
the events in Rwanda after reading a New York Times article by a member of an NGO Africa 
Watch. The ambassador was not familiar with Africa Watch, but it belonged to the Helsinki 
Watch network, which Kovanda knew well for their work on Czechoslovak dissidents during 
the Communist era.2 Kovanda recalls that he had ‘an a priori reason to trust the Africa Watch 
folks’; in addition, the article ‘had an internal logic’, which helped him realize the nature of 
the domestic and foreign interests involved in the Rwandan conflict (Kovanda, 2010, p. 201). 
Therefore, both the reputation and expertise of Africa Watch has played a role in attracting 
Czech diplomat's attention.  
 
2 The Helsinki Watch was created in 1978 as an umbrella organization for citizens' groups throughout the 
Soviet bloc monitoring the compliance with the 1975 Helsinki Accords. In 1981, Americas Watch was formed. 
Asia Watch (1985), Africa Watch (1988) and Middle East Watch (1989) followed. In 1988, these organizations 
adopted the name Human Rights Watch. See Human Rights Watch, ‘Our History’, 2015, available from 
<http://www.hrw.org/node/75134>, accessed 23 March 2015. Kovanda refers to Africa Watch and Human 
Rights Watch interchangeably. 
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Interested to learn more, Kovanda contacted Africa Watch and befriended Alison Des 
Forges, a leading specialist on Rwanda, who ‘became the source of accurate, dependable 
information about the situation in the country’ (Kovanda, 2010, p. 201). On 18 April, he 
invited her to brief the ten elected Council members. It was ‘a very unusual meeting during 
which “small countries”, nonpermanent UNSC members, had an opportunity to learn from 
reliable and extremely well informed, albeit informal, sources about the causes, origins, and 
course of the Rwanda catastrophe’ (Kovanda, 2010, p. 202). As for Alison Des Forges, the 
meeting was also ‘a quite extraordinary opportunity for her as an NGO representative to 
communicate directly with diplomats working on the UNSC’ (Kovanda, 2010, p. 202). In 
1994, the relationship between civil society and Security Council diplomats was still at a 
nascent stage.  
On April 19, two days before the Council's vote to reduce UNAMIR to a token 
presence, the executive director of Human Rights Watch wrote to New Zealand ambassador 
Colin Keating that ‘the Rwanda military authorities are engaged in a systematic campaign to 
eliminate the Tutsi’ (Melvern, 2000, p. 169). Keating also sought information from NGOs on 
his own initiative. Since the Secretariat did not communicate clearly what was going on in 
Rwanda, Keating started having personal meetings, sometimes two or three times a day, with 
representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the MSF. He 
then conveyed the information to other diplomats on the Council (Keating, 2004, p. 506). On 
26 April, the UK ambassador reported back to the Foreign Office the information that 
Keating had received from the MSF about the murder of doctors and patients in one of the 
hospitals run by the relief organization, which was described by the MSF Director-General as 
‘the worst atrocity seen by MSF since it was established’ (UK Mission to the UN, 1994, p. 2). 
The information provided to Keating by NGOs was reaching other Security Council 
diplomats and subsequently foreign ministries in their respective countries.   
On 28 April, a draft statement by the President of the Security Council, a non-binding 
but politically consequential document, was circulated by the Czech delegation, referring to 
the events in Rwanda as genocide. The draft also contained the following phrase: ‘In addition 
to information available from the Secretary-General, the Security Council has considered 
information available from well-respected NGOs’ (as cited in Kovanda, 2010, p. 218). It was 
‘unheard of’ but reflected the reality in which the ‘most valuable and most trustworthy 
information originated with Africa Watch, Amnesty International, the ICRC, and MSF, 
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whereas the UN Secretariat did not furnish much of value’ (Kovanda, 2010, p. 205). 
Following long negotiations, the term ‘genocide’ was dropped but the ethnic character of the 
killings was recognized.  
Besides, ‘not a word remained about the work of and information from NGOs that the 
Czech delegation had stressed in our original draft’ because ‘China and Oman were 
particularly loath to allow for a precedent of the Security Council's reacting to information 
from NGOs’ (Kovanda, 2010, p. 207). While many small and middle powers were eager to 
acknowledge the role of civil society in shaping their perceptions of the conflict (which was 
also an implicit criticism of the Secretariat's inability or unwillingness to provide accurate 
information), some major powers like China were anxious to preserve the state-centric nature 
of the Council politics. In general, as Cora Weiss of the Hague Appeal for Peace observes, 
‘the willingness to listen certainly depends on the member state and the flexibility of thinking 
of the ambassador’: while some ‘are really grateful to get information’ from NGOs, there are 
also ‘countries that feel treated by civil society’ (as cited in Niemetz, 2015, p. 47).  
 
NGOs and UNSC Permanent Members  
In addition to keeping contact with diplomats from non-permanent UNSC members, 
NGOs targeted powerful member states, most notably the US. When a complete withdrawal 
of UNAMIR was discussed, Alison des Forges and a representative of Rwandan NGO, the 
Association for the Defense of Human Rights and Public Liberties (known by its French 
acronym ADL), contacted US Ambassador Madeleine Albright. She ‘gave them a 
sympathetic hearing’ and directed them to the US National Security Council, which agreed to 
keep a small number of UN troops in Rwanda. ‘[L]obbying by human rights and 
humanitarian organizations’ is believed to have played a role (Des Forges, 2004, p. 35).  
Representatives of another humanitarian NGO, InterAction, attempted several times 
to meet with Madeleine Albright, but she declined. At the same time, international 
humanitarian NGOs spoke to other key US officials, such as Richard Clarke, the focal point 
for humanitarian policy, Anthony Lake, National Security Advisor, and other State 
Department officials from the interagency task force on Rwanda. In early May, Alison des 
Forges and an ADL representative met with the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
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African Affairs ‘and urged US support for an expanded UN force with a robust civilian 
protection mandate’ (Labonte, 2013, p. 109).  
NGOs targeted officials from other P-5 countries as well. After Oxfam had telephoned 
David Clark, shadow Secretary of State for Defence, the Labour Party put pressure on the UK 
government to provide diplomatic and logistical support to the UN operation (Melvern, 2000, 
p. 232). The support failed to materialize, despite promises. The belated and inadequate 
action by Security Council members is one of the reasons why some NGO representatives are 
quite pessimistic about their role during the genocide: the president of the US branch of Save 
the Children believes that ‘he did not succeed in changing a single US policy maker's opinion 
about intervening in Rwanda’ (as cited in Labonte, 2013, p. 119). While the UN failed to 
intervene forcefully to stop the genocide, a small presence was kept on the ground to observe 
the events and attempts were made to reinforce the mission.  
 
NGOs and Public Opinion 
In parallel to the efforts to pressure the Security Council, civil society continued to 
call public attention to the events in Rwanda. Both before and after UNAMIR's downsizing, 
‘[n]ewspaper editorials and opinion pieces (“op-eds”) by human rights workers or aid agency 
officials advocated UN intervention to stop the killing’ (Hilsum, 2007, p. 173). The overseas 
director of Oxfam wrote in The Guardian on 16 April that while the Council focused on 
protecting civilians in Bosnia, under-resourced UNAMIR troops ‘have to look away while 
people are hacked to death’. On 20 April, the executive director of Human Rights Watch 
called for a stronger UN response to the violence in Rwanda in a letter to The New York 
Times. On 1 May, the executive director of Amnesty International condemned the fact that 
while Bosnia was in the spotlight, ‘the massacres of tens of thousands in an African country 
is met with a collective denial of responsibility and a hasty retreat’ (all cited in Melvern, 
2007, p. 208). The mass publicity campaign continued after the decision to reinforce 
UNAMIR. On 23 May, the Secretary-General of MSF argued in a New York Times article 
that since a reinforced UNAMIR was not given a ‘clear mandate’ to protect civilians and 
without a prompt deployment of a sufficient number of troops, UNAMIR soldiers could ‘end 
up being mere observers of the cold-blooded massacres of defenseless women and children, 
allowed to take action only in “self-defense”’ (Destexhe, 1994). Therefore, civil society 
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actors not only targeted Security Council diplomats but also ran a campaign in the press to 
attract public attention to the genocide. 
  
Conclusion 
Over the years, the relationship between civil society and the UN Security Council 
strengthened and became more institutionalized. The NGO Working Group on the Security 
Council is a useful vehicle for keeping in touch with Council diplomats. Arria formula 
briefings are another mechanism for engaging with the Council, despite the recent doubts 
about its efficiency. However, during the genocide in Rwanda, it was highly unusual for 
Security Council diplomats to consult with NGOs. Civil society advocacy for a stronger UN 
response to the genocide was therefore groundbreaking.  
Assessments of the civil society's role during the events differ in the literature. James 
Paul (2004b, p. 381) believes that ‘Rwanda firmly established NGOs as indispensable 
information sources’. Similarly, according to the Security Council Report (2007), the 
Rwandan genocide was ‘[t]he first systematic process for incorporation of input from NGOs 
[which] had the widest presence in the field and were best able to report the true dimensions 
of what was actually unfolding throughout the countryside’. On the contrary, Melissa 
Labonte (2013, p. 100) argues that compared to the 1992-1993 crisis in Somalia, NGOs were 
less influential because they had a limited field presence during the initial weeks of the 
genocide and therefore ‘avoided lobbying policy makers on the matter’. As this chapter 
demonstrates, although NGOs mobilized only in mid- to late April 1994, they influenced 
officials and diplomats from permanent and non-permanent Security Council members as 
well as public opinion. While non-permanent Security Council members are expected to be 
more inclined to work with NGOs, as was indeed the case with the ambassadors of New 
Zealand and the Czech Republic, some officials from permanent member states were also 
open to civil society.  
The growth of civil society's engagement with the UN Security Council and other 
international organizations calls for further research on the issue. Depending on the 
investigator's theoretical perspective, two sets of questions can be interesting. Researchers 
who focus on international organizations might ask: What factors affect the receptivity of 
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international organizations to civil society's appeals? What models of engagement with civil 
society provide for the most fruitful exchanges? Researchers who focus on civil society, on 
the other hand, might ask: How do civil society actors choose strategies for targeting 
international organizations? What strategies are effective and under what conditions? A more 
nuanced understanding of the relationship between civil society and international institutions 
can enrich our understanding of international politics and help elaborate suggestions for 
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